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In a broad sense, logic is the field of formal languages for knowledge and truth that have a
formal semantics. It tends to be difficult to give a narrower definition because very different
kinds of logics exist. One of the most fundamental contrasts is between the different
methods of assigning semantics. Here two classes can be distinguished: model theoretical
semantics based on a foundation of mathematics such as set theory, and proof theoretical
semantics based on an inference system possibly formulated within a type theory.
Logical frameworks have been developed to cope with the variety of available logics
unifying the underlying ontological notions and providing a meta-theory to reason
abstractly about logics. While these have been very successful, they have so far focused
on either model or proof theoretical semantics. We contribute to a unified framework by
showing how the type/proof theoretical Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) can be applied
to the representation of model theoretical logics.
We give a comprehensive formal representation of first-order logic, covering both its
proof and its model theoretical semantics as well as its soundness in LF. For the model
theory, we have to represent the mathematical foundation itself in LF, and we provide two
solutions for that. Firstly, we give a meta-language that is strong enough to represent the
model theory while being simple enough to be treated as a fragment of untyped set theory.
Secondly, we represent Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory and show how it subsumes ourmeta-
language. Specific models are represented as LF morphisms.
All representations are given in andmechanically verified by the Twelf implementation
of LF. Moreover, we use the Twelf module system to treat all connectives and quantifiers
independently. Thus, individual connectives are available for reuse when representing
other logics, and we obtain the first version of a feature library from which logics can be
pieced together.
Our results andmethods are not restricted to first-order logic and scale to awide variety
of logical systems, thus demonstrating the feasibility of comprehensively formalizing large
scale representation theorems in a logical framework.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Logic has been an important research topic in mathematics and computer science since the foundational crisis of
mathematics. Research on logics has included the difficult and sometimes contentious question how to choose the
ontological foundations of logic. Logical frameworks have proved an important research result to answer this question —
they are abstract formalisms that permit the formal definition of specific logics.
Today we observe that there are two groups of logical frameworks: those based on set theoretical foundations of
mathematics that characterize logicsmodel theoretically, and those based on type theoretical foundations that characterize
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logics proof theoretically. The former go back to Tarski’s view of consequence [62,67], with institutions [21,26] and general
logics [41] being state of the art examples. The latter are usually based on the Curry–Howard correspondence [12,32],
examples being Automath [16], Isabelle [53], and the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF, [31]).
While somemodel theoretical frameworks attempt to integrate proof theory (e.g., [41,42,17]), the opposite integration is
less developed. This is unfortunate because many of the results and techniques developed for proof theoretical logics could
also benefit model-theoretical reasoning.
We are particularly interested in logic encodings in the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF), which is related toMartin-Löf
type theory and can be seen as the dependently-typed corner of the λ-cube [6]. LF represents syntax and proof theoretical
semantics of a logic using higher order abstract syntax and the judgments-as-types paradigm [44]. This has proved very
successful for proof-theoretical logic representations [34,3,55,52].
In [57], we introduced a framework that attempts to preserve and exploit the respective advantages of model and proof
theoretical representation. The central idea is to also represent the model theory of a logic in a type-theoretical logical
framework by specifying models in a suitable meta-language.
In this paper, we showhow to implement such logic representations in LF.We pick LF becausewe have recently equipped
the Twelf implementation of LF with a strong module system [56,59]. This module system is rigorously based on theory
morphisms, which have proved very successful to reason about model-theoretical logic representations (e.g., [21,4,61]).
Therefore, it is particularly appropriate for an encoding that combines proof- and model-theoretical aspects.
Our central results are (i) the full representation of first-order logic (FOL) comprising syntax, proof theory, and model
theory, and (ii) a formal proof of the soundness of FOL based on this representation that is verified mechanically by the LF
implementation Twelf. The collection of all models is represented axiomatically based on set theory, and specific models are
represented as LF morphisms. Since the LF morphisms can be enumerated, this leads to the philosophical question in what
sense it would be adequate to restrict attention to representable models.
While this is interesting in itself, themain value of our work is not the encoding but themethodologywe employ.We use
FOL as an example logic mainly because it is most widely known and thus interferes least with the rather abstract subject
matter. Other logics can be represented analogously.
Furthermore, we use the LF module system for a modular development of syntax, proof theory, model theory, and
soundness, i.e., all connectives and quantifiers are treated separately in all four parts of the encoding. These modules can
be reused flexibly to encode other logics. For example, we obtain encodings for any logic that arises by omitting some
connectives or quantifiers from FOL. Less trivially, the encoding of each connective or quantifier can be reused for any logic
using them. For example, this enabled one of our students to extend the work presented here to sorted FOLwithin two days.
Our approach is especially interesting when studying rarer or new logics, for which no smoothed-out semi-formal
definitions are available yet. In particular, our framework can be used for the rapid prototyping of logics. Since it covers
both proof and model theory, it permits an approach that we call syntax-semantics-codesign, to coin a phrase: Researchers
can give a fully formal and mechanically verified definition of a formal language and its semantics at a level of convenience
and elegance that competes with working it out on paper.
In Section 2, we describe some preliminaries and introduce some notation: FOL in Section 2.1, and LF in Section 2.2. In
Section 3, we sketch the framework we will use. The main sections of this paper are Sections 4 and 5. In the former, we
give the encoding of FOL in LF, where we use a variant of higher-order logic as a simple and convenient meta-language to
represent the models. In the latter, we extend the encoding to cover set theory itself as a foundation of mathematics, in
which models are expressed. Thus, we can give a comprehensive representation of FOL and its set-theoretical model theory
in LF. Both in Sections 4 and 5, we describe the encoding of FOL in a way that makes the general methodology apparent and
provides a template for the encoding of other logics.
A preliminary version of this paper has appeared as [33]. The present version has been fully revised and substantially
extended. Most importantly, the encoding of set theory, which was only sketched in [33], has been worked out. Among the
changes we made, two are especially notable. Firstly, we changed the meta-language employed to represent models from
Martin-Löf type theory to higher-order logic. This was motivated by the desire to separate types and propositions rather
than identify them. Secondly, in [33], we identified some features missing in the implementation of the LF module system.
These have now been added, which enabled us to completely refactor the LF encodings.
Our approach is very extensible and we have treated, or are currently working on, corresponding representations of
sorted, higher-order, and description logics. These are part of a logic atlas which is developed as a collaborative research
effort within the LATIN project [35]. All Twelf sources are available from the project website.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. First-order logic
In this section, we will introduce first-order logic in order to give an overview of the definitions and notations we will
use. The definitions here also serve as the reference definitions when proving the adequacy of our encodings.
Definition 1 (Signatures). AFOL-signature is a triple (Σf ,Σp, ar)whereΣf andΣp are disjoint sets of function andpredicate
symbols, respectively, and ar : Σf ∪ Σp → N assigns arities to symbols. We will treat constants and boolean variables as
the special case of arity 0.
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Definition 2 (Expressions). A FOL-context is a list of variables. For a signature Σ and a context Γ , the terms over Σ and Γ
are formed from the variables in Γ and the application of function symbols f ∈ Σf to terms according to ar(f ). The formulas
overΣ and Γ are formed from the application of predicate symbols p ∈ Σp to a number of terms according to ar(p) as well
as .=, true, false, ¬, ∧, ∨,⇒, ∀, and ∃ in the usual way. Formulas in the empty context are calledΣ-sentences, and we write
Sen(Σ) for the set of sentences.
Definition 3 (Theories). A FOL-theory is a pair (Σ,Θ) for a signatureΣ and a setΘ ⊆ Sen(Σ) of axioms.
Definition 4 (Signature Morphisms). Given two signatures Σ = (Σf ,Σp, ar) and Σ ′ = (Σ ′f ,Σ ′p, ar ′), a FOL-signature
morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′ is an arity-preserving mapping fromΣf toΣ ′f and fromΣp toΣ ′p.
The homomorphic extension of σ – which we also denote by σ – is the mapping from terms and formulas overΣ to terms
and formulas over Σ ′ that replaces every symbol s ∈ Σf ∪ Σp with σ(s). The sentence translation Sen(σ ) : Sen(Σ) →
Sen(Σ ′) arises as the special case of applying σ to sentences.
Example 5 (Monoids and Groups). We will use the theories Monoid = (MonSig,MonAx) and Group = (GrpSig,GrpAx) of
monoids and groups as running examples. MonSig f is the set {◦, e}, where ◦ is binary (written infix) and e is nullary, and
MonSigp is empty.MonAx consists of the axioms for
• associativity: ∀x ∀y ∀z x ◦ (y ◦ z) .= (x ◦ y) ◦ z,
• left-neutrality: ∀x e ◦ x .= x,
• right-neutrality: ∀x x ◦ e .= x.
The theory Group extends Monoid, i.e., GrpSig adds a unary function symbol inv (written as superscript −1) to MonSig , and
GrpAx adds axioms toMonAx for the following:
• left-inverseness: ∀x x−1 ◦ x .= e,
• right-inverseness: ∀x x ◦ x−1 .= e.
The inclusion mappingMonGrp is a signature morphism fromMonSig to GrpSig .
There are various ways to define the proof theory of FOL. In this paper we choose the natural deduction calculus (ND)
with introduction and elimination rules.Wewill use the phrase proof theoretical semanticswhen speaking about the induced
provability relation; we will not consider proof normalization, which some authors mean when using that phrase.
Definition 6 (Proof Theoretical Theorems). Given a theory (Σ,Θ), we say that F ∈ Sen(Σ) is a proof theoretical theorem of
(Σ,Θ) if the judgment F1, . . . , Fn ⊢Σ F is derivable for some {F1, . . . , Fn} ⊆ Θ using the calculus shown in Fig. 1. We
write this asΘ ⊢Σ F .
Definition 7 (Proof Theoretical Theory Morphisms). A signature morphism from Σ to Σ ′ is a proof theoretical theory
morphism from (Σ,Θ) to (Σ ′,Θ ′), written σ : (Σ,Θ) P→ (Σ ′,Θ ′), if Sen(σ ) maps the axioms of (Σ,Θ) to proof
theoretical theorems of (Σ ′,Θ ′), i.e., for all F ∈ Θ ,Θ ′ ⊢Σ ′ Sen(σ )(F) holds.
Lemma 8 (Proof Translation). Assume a proof theoretical theory morphism σ : (Σ,Θ) → (Σ ′,Θ ′). If F is a proof theoretical
theorem of (Σ,Θ), then Sen(σ )(F) is a proof theoretical theorem of (Σ ′,Θ ′). In other words, provability is preserved along proof
theoretical theory morphisms.
We develop themodel theory of FOL as an institution [21].
Definition 9 (Models of a FOL-Signature). A FOL-model of a signature Σ is a pair (U, I), where U is a non-empty set (called
the universe) and I is an interpretation function ofΣ-symbols such that
• f I ∈ UUn for f ∈ Σf with ar(f ) = n,
• pI ⊆ Un for p ∈ Σp with ar(p) = n.
We writeMod(Σ) for the class ofΣ-models.
Definition 10 (Model Theoretical Semantics). Assume a signatureΣ , a contextΓ , and aΣ-modelM = (U, I). An assignment
is a mapping from Γ to U . For an assignment α, the interpretations JtKM,α ∈ U of terms t and JFKM,α ∈ {0, 1} of formulas F
overΣ and Γ are defined in the usual way by induction on the syntax. Given a sentence F , we writeM |=Σ F if JFKM = 1.
Given a theory (Σ,Θ), we write the class of (Σ,Θ)-models as
Mod(Σ,Θ) = {M ∈ Mod(Σ) |M |=Σ F for all F ∈ Θ}.
Definition 11 (Model Theoretical Theorems). Given a theory (Σ,Θ), we say that F ∈ Sen(Σ) is amodel theoretical theorem
of (Σ,Θ) if the following holds for allΣ-modelsM: IfM |=Σ A for all A ∈ Θ , then alsoM |=Σ F . We write this asΘ |=Σ F .
Definition 12 (Model Reduction). Given a signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′ and a Σ ′-model M ′ = (U, I ′), we obtain a
Σ-model (U, I), called the model reduct of M ′ along σ , by putting sI = σ(s)I ′ for all symbols of Σ . We write Mod(σ ) :
Mod(Σ ′)→ Mod(Σ) for the induced model reduction.
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Θ ⊢Σ true
Θ ⊢Σ false
Θ ⊢Σ F
Θ, F ⊢Σ false
Θ ⊢Σ ¬ F
Θ ⊢Σ ¬ F Θ ⊢Σ F
Θ ⊢Σ false
Θ ⊢Σ F Θ ⊢Σ G
Θ ⊢Σ F ∧G
Θ ⊢Σ F ∧G
Θ ⊢Σ F
Θ ⊢Σ F ∧G
Θ ⊢Σ G
Θ, F ⊢Σ G
Θ ⊢Σ F⇒G
Θ ⊢Σ F⇒G Θ ⊢Σ F
Θ ⊢Σ G
Θ ⊢Σ F
Θ ⊢Σ F ∨G
Θ ⊢Σ G
Θ ⊢Σ F ∨G
Θ ⊢Σ F ∨G Θ, F ⊢Σ H Θ,G⊢Σ H
Θ ⊢Σ H
Θ ⊢Σ F x fresh
Θ ⊢Σ ∀ x F
Θ ⊢Σ ∀ x F
Θ ⊢Σ F [x/t]
Θ ⊢Σ F [x/t]
Θ ⊢Σ ∃ x F
Θ ⊢Σ ∃ x F x fresh Θ, F ⊢Σ H
Θ ⊢Σ H
F ∈Θ
Θ ⊢Σ F Θ ⊢Σ F ∨¬ F
Θ ⊢Σ t .= t
Θ ⊢Σ s .= t
Θ ⊢Σ t .= s
Θ ⊢Σ r .= s Θ ⊢Σ s .= t
Θ ⊢Σ r .= t
Θ ⊢Σ si .= ti f∈Σf ar(f )=n
Θ ⊢Σ f (s1,...,sn) .= f (t1,...,tn)
Θ ⊢Σ si .= ti p∈Σp ar(p)=n
Θ ⊢Σ p(s1,...,sn)⇒ p(t1,...,tn)
Fig. 1. Proof rules.
Definition 13 (Model Theoretical Theory Morphisms). Given two theories (Σ,Θ) and (Σ ′,Θ ′), a model theoretical theory
morphism from (Σ,Θ) to (Σ ′,Θ ′), written σ : (Σ,Θ) M→ (Σ ′,Θ ′), is a signature morphism from Σ to Σ ′ such
that Mod(σ ) reduces models of (Σ ′,Θ ′) to models of (Σ,Θ), i.e, for all M ′ ∈ Mod(Σ ′,Θ ′), we have Mod(σ )(M ′) ∈
Mod(Σ,Θ).
Lemma 14 (Satisfaction Condition). Assume a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′, a Σ-sentence F , and a Σ ′-model M ′.
Then M ′ |=
Σ ′ Sen(σ )(F) iffMod(σ )(M
′) |=Σ F .
Example 15 (Continued). The integers form a model Int = (Z,+, 0,−) for the theory of groups (where we use
a tuple notation to give the universe and the interpretations of ◦, e, and inv, respectively). The model reduction
Mod(MonGrp)(Int) = (Z,+, 0) alongMonGrp yields the integers seen as a model of the theory of monoids.
We have given both proof theoretical andmodel theoretical definitions of theorem and theory morphism. In general, these
must be distinguished to avoid a bias towards proof ormodel theory. However, they coincide if a logic is sound and complete:
Theorem 16 (Soundness and Completeness). Assume a FOL-theory (Σ,Θ) and a Σ-sentence F . Then Θ ⊢Σ F iff Θ |=Σ F .
Therefore, for a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′, we have σ : (Σ,Θ) P→ (Σ ′,Θ ′) iff σ : (Σ,Θ) M→ (Σ ′,Θ ′).
2.2. LF and Twelf
LF [31] is a dependent type theory that extends simple type theory with dependent function types. We will work with
the Twelf implementation of LF [56]. The main use of LF and Twelf is as a logical framework in which deductive systems are
represented.
We will develop the syntax and semantics of LF along an example representation of simple type theory (STT). Typically,
kinded type families are declared to represent the syntactic classes of the system. For STT, we declare
tp : type
tm : tp → type
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Here type is the LF-kind of types, and tp is an LF-type whose LF-terms represent the STT-types. tp → type is the kind
of type families that are indexed by terms of LF-type tp; then tm A is the LF-type whose terms represent the STT-terms of
type A.
Typed constants are declared to represent the expressions of the represented system. For STT, we add
=⇒ : tp → tp → tp %infix right 0=⇒
@ : tm (A =⇒ B)→ tm A → tm B %infix left 1000 @
λ : (tm A → tm B)→ tm (A =⇒ B)
Here=⇒ is a low-binding right-associative infix symbol that takes two tp-arguments and returns a tp. It represents STT-
function type formation. In the following, we will always omit the fixity and associativity declarations if they are clear from
the context. In particular, besides =⇒ and @, binary symbols such as connectives and equality are always assumed to be
declared as infix.
@ is a strong-binding left-associative infix symbol that takes two arguments – an STT-term of type A =⇒ B and an STT-
term of type A – and returns an STT-term of type B. It represents STT-function elimination, i.e., application. In the declaration
of @, A and B are free variables. These variables are implicitlyΠ-bound at the outside. The full type of @ is
ΠA:tpΠB:tptm (A =⇒ B)→ tm A → tm B,
i.e., @ really takes 4 arguments. This uses the main feature of dependent type theory: The first two arguments A and Bmay
occur in the types of the later arguments and in the return type. Twelf treats A and B as implicit arguments and infers their
values from the other arguments. Thus, we can write f @ a instead of @ A B f a.
Finally, λ represents STT-function introduction, i.e., abstraction. λ is declared using higher-order abstract syntax. LF-
functions of type S → T are in bijection to the terms of type T with a free variable of type S; thus, higher-order arguments
can be used to represent binders. The above λ takes a term of STT-type Bwith a free variable of type A represented as an LF
term of type tm A → tm B. It returns an STT term of type A =⇒ B.
We will always use Twelf notation for the LF primitives of binding and application: The type Πx:AB(x) of dependent
functions taking x : A to an element of B(x) is written {x : A} B x, and the function term λx:At(x) taking x : A to t(x) is written
[x : A] t x. (Therefore, λ is available for user-declared symbols.) In particular, in the above example, the STT-term λx:At is
represented as the LF-term λ[x : A] t . Finally, we write A → B instead of {x : A} B if x does not occur in B, and we will also
omit the types of bound variables if they can be inferred.
LF employs the Curry–Howard correspondence to represent proofs-as-terms [12,32] and extends it to the judgments-as-
types methodology [44]. For example, we can turn the above STT into a logic by adding a type prop of propositions and a
truth judgment True on it:
prop : type
True : prop → type
⇒ : prop → prop → prop
⇒E : True (F ⇒ G) → True F → True G
Here the type True F represents the judgment that F is true. A judgment J is proved if there is a term of type J .
Consequently, all axioms and inference rules such as the implication elimination rule ⇒E are represented as constants,
and proofs of F are represented as terms of type True F .
Finally, an LF signature is a list of kinded type family declarations a : K and typed constant declarations c : A. Both may
carry definitions, i.e., c : A = t introduces c as an abbreviation for t . This yields the following grammar for the fragment of
LF we will use:
Signatures Σ ::= · | Σ, c : A | Σ, c : A = t | Σ, a : K | Σ, a : K = A
Morphisms σ ::= · | σ , c := t | σ , a := A
Kinds: K ::= type | A → K
Type families: A, B ::= a | [x : A] B | B t | {x : A} B
Terms: s, t ::= c | x | [x : A] t | s t
Here we have already included LF signature morphisms. Given two signaturesΣ andΣ ′, a signature morphism σ : Σ →
Σ ′ is a typing-preservingmap ofΣ-symbols toΣ ′-expressions. Thus, σ maps every constant c : A ofΣ to a term σ(c) : σ(A)
and every type family symbol a : K to a type family σ(a) : σ(K). Here, σ is the homomorphic extension of σ to Σ-
expressions, and we will write σ instead of σ from now on.
The homomorphic extension preserves typing, i.e., a Σ-expression E : F is mapped to a Σ ′-expression σ(E) : σ(F). In
particular, because σ mustmap all axioms or inference rules declared inΣ to proofs or derived inference rules, respectively,
overΣ ′, signature morphisms preserve the provability of judgments.
We will write σ σ ′ for the diagram-order composition of signature morphisms, i.e., (σ σ ′)(E) = σ ′(σ (E)).
The module system for LF and Twelf [59] is based on the notion of signature morphisms [34]. The toplevel declarations
of modular LF declare named signatures and named signature morphisms, called views, e.g.,
%sig S = {Σ}. %sig T = {Σ ′}. %view v : S → T = {σ }.
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Since signature morphisms must map axioms to proofs, a view has the flavor of a theorem establishing a translation from S
to T or a representation of S in T or a refinement of S into T .
Besides views, the module system provides inclusion morphisms that hold by definition: %include S declared in T
copies all declarations of S into T (thus changing T ). This represents an inheritance or import relationship from S to T . The
inclusion relation is transitive, and multiple inclusions of the same signature are identified. Twelf uses qualified names to
access included symbols, but we will simply assume that included symbols c of S are accessible as c within T .
R
S
T
vS
vR
Views can be given modularly, too. If S includes R, then a view vS from S to T must map all
constants of S, i.e., also those of R. Often a view vR from R to T is already present. In that case vS can
include vR via %include vR and only give maps for the symbols of S. If vS is defined like that, the
triangle on the right always commutes.
Thus, we arrive at the following grammar for the fragment of modular LF we will use. Here we
use E for a kind, type family, or term as defined above:
Start G ::= · | G, DT | G, Dv
Signatures DT ::= %sig T = {Σ}
Views Dv ::= %view v : S → T = {σ }
Sign. body Σ ::= · | Σ, c : E | Σ, c : E = E | Σ, %include S
View body σ ::= · | σ , c := E | σ , %include v
3. A logical framework combining proof and model theory
LF was designed as a language for the representation of formal systems. Similarly, the LF module systemwas designed as
a language for the representation of translations between formal systems. This makes it a very appropriate framework for
the comprehensive representation of a logic where translations – between different signatures of a logic as well as between
syntax and semantics – are prevalent.
In the following, we will give an overview of the logical framework we gave in [57,58]. We will not actually give the
framework itself, which requires a further level of abstraction beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we define what the
encoding of an individual logic looks like.
Lsyn
Lpf
Lmod
µ
π
Weassume a logic L defined along the lines of Section 2.1. An encoding of L in our framework
consists of three LF signatures Lsyn for the syntax, Lpf for the proof theory, and Lmod for themodel
theory, as well as two LF signature morphisms π andµ that translate the syntax into proof and
model theory.
Lsyn contains LF declarations for all symbols occurring in L-formulas. Type declarations are
used for syntactic classes, e.g., sorts, terms, formulas, and judgments (typically including a truth
judgment), and constant declarations are used for individual connectives, quantifiers, sorts,
functions, predicates, axioms, etc. Lpf is typically an extension of Lsyn, i.e., π is an inclusion
morphism. Lpf includes constant declarations for the axioms and inference rules of L; it may also contain type declarations
for auxiliary judgments.
Lsyn typically declares at least a type o of formulas and a type family ded : o → type for the truth judgment. In the
simplest case, Lpf only adds inference rules for ded to Lsyn.
Lmod contains declarations that describemodels. Formodel theoreticallymotivated logics such as first-order logic, Lsyn and
Lmod have a similar structure — after all for many logics L, the syntax was introduced as a way to describe the models in the
first place. But for proof theoretically motivated logics like some modal logics or intuitionistic logics, the model theory was
developed a posteriori. For these, the Lsyn and Lmod may vary considerable, e.g., Lmod might contain declarations to describe
Kripke frames.
Lmod typically includes some meta-language that is used to reason about the truth in models, e.g., set theory. In the
simplest case µ translates o to a type of truth values and ded to a predicate that holds for the designated truth values. Then
Lmod axiomatizes the translation of formulas to truth values.
A specific signatureΣ of L is represented as an extension of L. This corresponds to the uniform logic encodings in LF given
in [34]. For example, signatures of propositional logic are sets of propositional variables, and the set Σ = {p1, . . . , pn} is
encoded as the LF-signature
Σ syn = Lsyn, p1 : o, . . . , pn : o.
By mergingΣ syn with Lpf and Lmod, we obtainΣpf andΣmod, respectively. This leads to the diagram below.
Lsyn
Lpf
Lmod
Σ syn
Σpf
Σmod
µ
π
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B0syn B1syn
¬syn ∨syn ∀syn ∃syn
PLsyn FOLsyn
Fig. 2.Modular encoding of FOL syntax.
Technically, Σpf and Σmod are obtained as pushouts, a concept from category theory. We refer to [37] for the basics of
category theory and only remark that the category of LF-signatures has pushouts along inclusions [34]. Intuitively,Σmod is
obtained as follows: Take Lmod and add to it the translation along µ of all those declarations in Σ syn that are not in Lsyn. In
other words,Σmod is the union of Lmod andΣ syn sharing Lsyn.Σpf is obtained accordingly.
ThenΣ-sentences F are represented as β-η-normal LF-terms of type o over the signatureΣ syn. We will write pFq for the
LF-term representing the sentence F . An encoding is adequate for the syntax if this representation is a bijection.
Similarly, Σ-proofs of F using assumptions F1, . . . , Fn are represented as β-η-normal LF-terms over Σpf of type
π (ded F1 → · · · → ded Fn → ded F). Again we write pPq for the encoding of the proof P and say that the encoding is
adequate if it is a bijection.
We will elaborate on the representation ofΣ-models and the truth in models throughout the text.
It is noteworthy how the framework takes a balanced position between proof and model theoretical perspectives on
logic. In particular, the type ded F is used to represent truth both proof and model theoretically. Proof theoretically, terms
of type ded F represent proofs of F , model theoretically ded F is a predicate on the truth value of F .
A particular feature of the framework is that soundness can be represented very naturally: A soundness proof of L is
represented as a view from Lpf to Lmod that makes the resulting triangle commute. We will get back to that in Section 4.6.
This framework is closely related to the logical frameworks of institutions [21] and LF [31]. From the perspective of
institutions, it can be seen as utilizing LF-signatures to obtain concrete, strongly typed syntax to define signatures and
sentences. Similarly, LF-signature morphisms are used to describe models in a way similar to parchments [20]. A difference
is the inclusion of proof theory and the separation into signaturesΣ syn,Σpf , andΣmod. Furthermore, the way LF is used to
define logics and to do so modularly goes back to ideas from [34,64].
From the perspective of LF, it adds signature morphisms as a means to reason about translations between signatures and
logics in addition to the reasoning about logics and signatures possible with the existing logic representations. In this work,
we give a concrete semantic domain, which permits the representation of models in the framework as well.
4. Representing first-order logic
As described in Section 3, the encoding of FOL in LF consists of signatures FOLsyn for the syntax, FOLpf for the proof theory,
and FOLmod for the model theory, together with two views
π : FOLsyn → FOLpf and µ : FOLsyn → FOLmod.
FOL signatures and theories will be encoded as extensions of FOLsyn.
FOLsyn
FOLpf
FOLmod
HOL
µ
π
Wewill describe FOLsyn in Section 4.1, FOLpf andπ in Section 4.2, and FOLmod andµ in
Section 4.4. FOLmod will include a meta-language in which the models are specified. In
textbook style descriptions, this meta-language is usually natural language implicitly
based on some set-theoretical foundation of mathematics. We have to formalize this
meta-language and thus pick an intuitionistic logic on top of simple type theory, which
we refer to as HOL. We define it in Section 4.3. Then we discuss the adequacy of our
encoding in Section 4.5. Finally, we prove the soundness of FOL by giving a view from
FOLpf to FOLmod in Section 4.6.
When encoding signatures and theories in LF, we have the problem that definitions
of FOL signatures usually permit arbitrary objects as symbol names. But LF and Twelf
expressions have to be words over a countable alphabet. Therefore, we employ two
restrictions that are somewhat severe theoretically but natural for applications in computer science. From now on, all FOL
theories have a finite number of function and predicate symbols and axioms. It is straightforward to define encodings
for infinite theories, but type-theoretical frameworks usually avoid reasoning about infinite signatures. Furthermore, all
function and predicate symbols are chosen from a fixed countable set, and without loss of generality, we assume this set to
be the set of legal Twelf identifiers. Thus, we can use the same names in FOL signatures and their encodings.
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%sig B0syn = {
o : type
ded : o → type
}
%sig ¬syn = {
%include B0syn
¬ : o → o
}
%sig ∨syn = {
%include B0syn
∨ : o → o → o
}
%sig PLsyn = {
%include ¬syn
%include ∨syn
}
%sig B1syn = {
%include B0syn
i : type
}
%sig ∀syn = {
%include B1syn
∀ : (i → o)→ o
}
%sig ∃syn = {
%include B1syn
∃ : (i → o)→ o
}
%sig FOLsyn = {
%include PLsyn
%include ∀syn
%include ∃syn
}
Fig. 3. LF signatures for FOL syntax.
4.1. Representing syntax
We encode the signature FOLsyn modularly, where each logical connective and quantifier is declared in a separate LF
signature. Themodular representation of FOLsyn is illustrated by the diagram in Fig. 2. Each node corresponds to a LF signature
and each edge to an inclusion morphism. B0syn and B1syn are base signatures for propositional and first-order respectively,
each connective or quantifier is encoded as an extension of the base signature, and then PLsyn for propositional logic and
FOLsyn for first-order logic are encoded by including the needed fragments.
We only give some of the fragments as examples. The full encoding has one signature each for true, false, ¬, ∨, ∧,⇒, ∀,
∃ and .=, and all of those are included into FOLsyn.
The LF signatures are given in Fig. 3. In the signature B0syn, we introduce the type o for formulas and a type family
ded : o → type for the truth judgment on formulas. In the signatures ¬syn and ∨syn, we introduce ¬ and ∨ respectively.
Both¬syn and∨syn inherit the symbols o and ded by including B0syn.Wemerge them to form the signature PLsyn. The signature
B1syn extends B0syn with a type i for terms. We introduce the universal and existential quantifiers in the signatures ∀syn and
∃syn, respectively. Finally, we define FOLsyn by including the signatures PLsyn, ∀syn and ∃syn.
We can now encode FOL-signatures as LF-signatures that extend FOLsyn. The distinction between signatures and theories
is not important from the perspective of LF as the encoding of axioms is very similar to the encoding of function and predicate
symbols. Furthermore, we can always consider signatures as the special case of theories without axioms. Therefore, we will
unify them and useΣ for both signatures and theories.
Definition 17 (Encoding Syntax). Let Σ be a FOL-signature or theory. We define the LF-encoding Σ syn of Σ as the LF-
signature that includes FOLsyn and adds the following symbol declarations:
• f : i → . . .→ i  
n
→ i for function symbols f ofΣ with ar(f ) = n,
• p : i → . . .→ i  
n
→ o for predicate symbols p ofΣ with ar(p) = n,
• a : ded pFq for axioms F ofΣ and some fresh name a.
Here pFq is the encoding of F ∈ Sen(Σ). EveryΣ-term t or formula F in context x1, . . . , xn is encoded as an LF term ptq : i
or pFq : o, respectively, in context x1 : i, . . . , xn : i. ptq and pFq are defined by an obvious induction, and we only give the
case of quantifiers as an example:
p∀x Fq = ∀[x : i] pFq.
Definition 18 (Encoding Signature Morphisms). Let σ : Σ → Σ ′ be a FOL signature morphism. Its LF-encoding is the LF
signature morphism σ syn : Σ syn → Σ ′syn that maps all symbols of FOLsyn to themselves and every function or predicate
symbol s ofΣ syn to the symbol σ(s) ofΣ ′syn.
Example 19. Monoidsyn is the encoding of the theory Monoid from Example 5. For example, the binary function symbol ◦
in MonSig is encoded as the symbol ◦ : i → i → i that takes two arguments of LF-type i and returns an LF-term of type i.
Groupsyn is defined accordingly.
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B0pf B1pf
¬pf ∨pf ∀pf ∃pf
PLpf FOLpf
Fig. 4.Modular encoding of FOL proof theory.
%sig Monoidsyn = {
%include FOLsyn
◦ : i → i → i %infix ◦
e : i
assoc : ded ∀ [x] ∀ [y] ∀ [z] x ◦ (y ◦ z) .= (x ◦ y) ◦ z
neutl : ded ∀ [x] (e ◦ x) .= x
neutr : ded ∀ [x] (x ◦ e) .= x
}
4.2. Representing proof theory
The encoding of the FOL proof theory has the samemodular structure as the encoding of the FOL syntax. This is illustrated
in Fig. 4 where each node has one additional – not displayed – inclusion from its counterpart in Fig. 2.
The signatures B0pf and B1pf typically contain the structural rules of the chosen calculus. In our case, they are equal to the
signature B0syn and B1syn because encodings of natural deduction calculi in LF automatically inherit weakening, exchange,
and contraction rules from LF. We distinguish these signatures anyway because of the conceptual clarity, and because the
analogues of B0pf or B1pf in the encodings of other logics do contain additional declarations, e.g., when using sequent or
tableaux calculi.
%sig B0pf = {
%include B0syn
}
%sig B1pf = {
%include B0pf
%include B1syn
}
The signatures ¬pf , ∀pf , etc. encode the introduction and elimination rules for the individual connectives. We refer to
[31] for details about the encoding of proof rules and give only disjunction as an example.
%sig ∨pf = {
%include B0pf
%include ∨syn
orIl : ded F → ded F ∨ G
orIr : ded G → ded F ∨ G
orE : ded F ∨ G → (ded F → ded H)
→ (ded G → ded H) → ded H
}
Finally, the signatures PLpf and FOLpf collect the fragments in almost the same way as for the syntax encodings. The only
difference in PLpf is that the law of excluded middle is added:
%sig PLpf = {
%include ¬pf
%include ∨pf
tnd : ded F ∨ ¬F
}
Similarly, there is one further proof rule added to FOLpf : the axiom ded ∃[x] true. This axiommay be surprising because it
is redundant in usual axiomatizations of FOL. This redundancy is due to the∀ elimination rule,which can instantiate∀[x] true
with any term including fresh variables. This amounts to assuming non-emptiness of the universe. In LF, only terms that are
well-formed in the current context are eligible, so that we obtain a system that is complete for a variant of FOL where the
universe may be empty. Therefore, we explicitly add an axiom to make it non-empty.
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Definition 20. For every FOL-signature or theoryΣ , the LF signatureΣpf is the canonical pushout of the diagram below.
FOLsyn
FOLpf
Σ syn
Σpf
π πΣ
Here by canonical wemean thatΣpf includes FOLpf and adds a declaration c : πΣ (A) for every declaration c : A thatΣ syn
adds to FOLsyn. πΣ maps FOLsyn-symbols according to π and other symbols to themselves.
Note that in the special case of FOL, both π and πΣ are inclusions.
We have the Curry–Howard representation of proofs as terms:
Definition 21 (Encoding Proofs). For a FOL-theoryΣ , every derivation p of F1, . . . , Fn ⊢Σ F is encoded as an LF term
ppq : ded pF1q→ . . .→ ded pFnq→ ded pFq
overΣpf by a straightforward induction.
4.3. A meta-language for the representation of model theory
Foundations. As all formal representations, the representation of themodel theory requires a suitablemeta-language. For the
syntax and proof theory, LF is a very appropriate meta-language — this is not surprising because it is what LF was designed
to be. LF only offers minimal syntactic means: judgments as types with implication (via→) and universal quantification
(viaΠ ), and the former is just a special case of the latter. Still, it has been quite successful at covering a large class of logics
because the syntax and proof theory of a logic are often (and in fact should usually be — see [44]) defined in terms of a
grammar, judgments about its expressions, and an inference system for these judgments. LF can be seen as the result of
applying Occam’s razor to these requirements.
The situation is different for the representation of model theory. Models are described in the language of mathematics,
and it is difficult to formalize this language without making a foundational commitment. For example, we could choose a
variant of set theory (as in [54,65]), higher-order logic ([14], as in [25,51,30]), Martin-Löf type theory ([43], as in [50]), or
the calculus of constructions ([13], as in [7,1]), all of which provide implementations with strong computational support. LF,
on the other hand, is too weak to be such a foundation because the type theory is minimalistic and the use of higher-order
abstract syntax is incompatible with the natural way of adding computational power.
However, because of this weakness, LF can serve as a minimal, neutral framework in which to formalize the foundation
itself. Moreover, since the choice of foundation changes the notion ofmodel (and thus possibly the truth of a statement about
models), an encoding can only be adequate relative to a fixed foundation. For example, consider first-order logicwithmodels
taken in a set theory with large cardinals. Therefore, it is even desirable to make the foundation part of the encoding. This
also has the benefit that it becomes possible to build foundations modularly and to compare and translate between them.
For example, we have formalized Mizar and Isabelle/HOL along with translations into ZFC set theory [35].
Approximating foundations. In this paper, we choose ZFC set theory as the foundation because it is the standard foundation of
mathematics. Therefore, we encode ZFC in LF and use it as themeta-language to definemodels. However, ZFC behaves badly
computationally because it is engineered towards elegance and simplicity rather than decidability or efficiency. Therefore,
we also use a second meta-language – a variant of higher-order logic (HOL) – which can be worked with efficiently.
The intuition is that ZFC gives the official definition, and HOL is a sound but incomplete approximation of ZFC. Using the
module system, we can state the relation between HOL and ZFC precisely by giving an LF signature morphism ϕ from HOL
to ZFC. Via ϕ, we can regard ZFC as a refinement of HOL or HOL as a fragment of ZFC. Of course, HOL is not complete (relative
to standard models in ZFC) and thus does not necessarily yield adequate encodings of model theory. However, for certain
results, working with HOL is sufficient, and then it is preferable.
Moreover, we can construct a chain of foundations of increasing strength, e.g., HOL→ ZF→ ZFC, and always work in the
weakest possible foundation. This is in keeping with mathematical practice not to commit to a specific foundation unless
necessary, and leads to an approach we call little foundations (inspired by [18]). For example, our encodings in [35] avoid the
use of excluded middle and the axiom of choice whenever possible.
In this section, we will only consider HOL, which we introduce below and use as the meta-language to represent models
in Section 4.4. In Section 5, we encode ZFC set theory in LF, refine our HOL-based semantics into a ZFC-based one, and revisit
the encoding of model theory.
HOL as a meta-language. For the representation of first-order logic, we need the booleans bool, an arbitrary set univ (the
universe), and functions between the universe and the booleans. Among the latter are functions from univn to univ, from
univn to bool, and from bool and bool2 to bool interpreting the function symbols, predicate symbols, and the propositional
connectives, respectively. Furthermore, the quantifiers must be interpreted as second-order functions from booluniv to bool.
Finally, these functions should be typed, and that leads us to the choice of HOL as the meta-language.
To define HOL, we encode it as the LF signature given in Fig. 5. Actually, we only give a partial signature here and omit
all the proof rules. The full version of the encoding of HOL can be found at [35]. Note that this signature extends the running
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%sig HOL = {
set : type
=⇒ : set → set → set
elem : set → type
λ : (elem A → elem B)→ elem (A =⇒ B)
@ : elem (A =⇒ B)→ elem A → elem B
prop : type
True : prop → type
true : prop
false : prop
∧ : prop → prop → prop
⇒ : prop → prop → prop
¬ : prop → prop
∨ : prop → prop → prop
⇔ : prop → prop → prop
.= : elem A → elem A → prop
∀ : (elem A → prop)→ prop
∃ : (elem A → prop)→ prop
}
Fig. 5. Encoding of HOL syntax.
example of Section 2.2, except that we write set and elem instead of tp and tm to emphasize the relation to set theory. set
is the type of sets, and =⇒ gives the set of functions between two sets. elem A is the type of elements of set A – this lets
us reason about the elements of a set without using the ∈ relation. HOL must be a sound but not necessarily a complete
fragment of set theory: Thus, the relation a : elem Amust imply a ∈ A, but the inverse does not have to hold. Then λ and @
encode function formation and application. This yields the standard encoding of simple type theory in LF.
Finally, prop is the type of propositions. The propositional connectives are declared in the usual way. Equality and the
quantifiers take an implicit argument A for the set which they operate on. Note that this means that we use equality only
between elements of the same set and only use bound quantifiers. We omit the proof rules for HOL here and only state
that we use rules for β- and η-conversion, and natural deduction introduction and elimination rules for the connectives and
quantifiers. Equality is axiomatized as a congruence relation on each type. We do not assume the axiom of excluded middle
– this turns out to suffice to axiomatize FOL models and makes us more flexible because we are not a priori committed to
classical foundations of mathematics.
It is interesting to note that the actual encoding in LF is a little different because it already benefits from the LF module
system: Our logic library represents the syntax and proof theory of the propositional connectives once and for all, and they
are imported both into the object logic FOL and into the meta-language HOL.
The use of HOL as the meta-language means that the model theory of the object language (e.g., FOL) is represented as an
extension of the signature HOL, i.e., a HOL-theory. Therefore, we define:
Definition 22 (HOL-Theories). A theory of HOL is an LF signature that includes the signature HOL and that only adds
declarations of the following forms:
• base sets: S : set ,
• constant symbols: c : elem S for some set S,
• axioms: a : True F for some proposition F .
While the model theory of the object language is represented as a HOL-theory, every individual model is represented as
a HOL-model. Therefore, we have to define HOL-models as well. In Section 5, we will show how models can be encoded as
syntactical entities of LF, but here we will do something simpler and define (standard) HOL models as platonic objects in an
underlying set theoretical universe:
Definition 23 (HOL-Models). Assume a fixed set theoretical universe. A model M of an HOL-theory T is a mapping that
assigns:
• to every base set S : set a set SM ,
• to every constant symbol c : elem S an element cM ∈ SM ,
such that FM is true for every axiom a : True F . Here SM is obtained by recursively replacing (S1 =⇒ S2)M with the set of
functions from SM1 to S
M
2 . F
M is obtained by replacing every base set S or constant c occurring in F with SM or cM , respectively,
and evaluating the result as a proposition over the set theoretical universe.
Definition 23 is somewhat vague. For sake of definiteness, we can assume ZFC as the underlying set theory:
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Example 24 (HOL-Models in ZFC). If our underlying set theory is ZFC, we can define FM as follows:
1. replace all S and c with SM and cM , respectively,
2. relativize all quantifiers, i.e., ∀ [x : elem S] F becomes ∀x ∈ SM . FM ,
3. replace S =⇒ S ′ with the set of functions from SM to S ′M , and replace λ and @ with function formation and function
application.
Then we are ready to represent the model theory of object logics in HOL in Section 4.4.
4.4. Representing model theory
FOLsyn FOLmod
HOL
µ
In this section, we present our representation of FOL model theory in LF. Our
encoding of FOLmodel theory consists of two parts, as illustrated in the diagram
on the right: The specification of FOLmodels (given by the signature FOLmod) and
the interpretation of FOL syntax in terms of the semantics (given by the view µ
from FOLsyn to FOLmod). Both FOLmod andµ follow the samemodular structure as
in FOLsyn and FOLpf , however, for the sake of simplicity, we will present the flat
version of our encoding in this paper.
Specification of FOL models. In FOLmod, we first encode the model theoretical notion of truth and the universe of a model. We
declare a set boolwhich represents the set {0, 1} of truth values and axiomatize this by declaring 0 and 1, and axioms axcons
and axboole to state that bool is indeed the desired 2-element set:
bool : set
0 : elem bool
1 : elem bool
axcons : True ¬ (0 .= 1)
axboole : {F} True (F .= 0 ∨ F .= 1)
Recall that True : prop → type is the truth judgment of the meta-language HOL, that ¬ and ∨ are the negation and
disjunction on HOL propositions, and .= is the typed-equality of HOL terms. In particular, these symbols are different from
the symbols of the same name in the syntax of FOL.
We declare the symbol univ as a set for the universe of a FOL-model, and add an axiom making univ non-empty.
univ : set
nonemp : True ∃ [x : elem univ] true
Nextwe encode the semantics of the logical symbols introduced in FOLsyn. For each logical symbol ssyn in FOLsyn, we declare
a symbol smod, which represents the semantic operation used to interpret ssyn along with axioms specifying its values. This
corresponds to the case-based definition of the semantics of a formula.
As examples we present the cases for ∨ and ∀. For the interpretation of ∨, we declare the symbol or as a HOL-function
from bool2 to bool and axiomatize it to be the binary supremum in the boolean 2-element lattice.
or : elem (bool =⇒ bool =⇒ bool)
or1 : True ((F .= 1 ∨ G .= 1) ⇒ (or @ F @G) .= 1)
or0 : True ((F .= 0 ∧ G .= 0) ⇒ (or @ F @G) .= 0)
Similarly, for the interpretation of ∀, we specify the function forall that takes a univ-indexed family F of booleans and
returns its infimum, i.e., it returns 1 iff all F@x is 1 for all x.
forall : elem ((univ =⇒ bool) =⇒ bool)
forall1 : {F : elem (univ =⇒ bool)}
True (∀ [x : elem univ] (F @ x) .= 1 ⇒ (forall@ F) .= 1)
forall0 : {F : elem (univ =⇒ bool)}
True (∃ [x : elem univ] (F @ x) .= 0 ⇒ (forall@ F) .= 0)
An overview of the operations and axioms declared for the remaining connectives and quantifiers is given in Fig. 6. In all
cases except for equality, we have two axioms of the form C0 ⇒ F .= 0 and C1 ⇒ F .= 1, e.g., and0 for when a conjunction
is false and and1 for when it is true. For equality, our results below require a slightly stronger condition, namely the axiom
eq1 of the form C1 ⇔ F .= 1 (from which the corresponding¬C1 ⇔ F .= 0 can be derived).
Interpretation function. The idea of the view µ is that it maps from the syntax to the semantics; it gives the cases of the
interpretation function for the logical symbols. This takes the form of a view from FOLsyn to FOLmod, which must give a
FOLmod-expression for all symbols declared in or included into FOLsyn.
Formulas are interpreted as boolean truth values, andwemap the type o of formulas to the type elem bool of truth values.
The truth value 1 is designated, i.e., represents truth. Therefore, wemap ded to a type family that takes an argument F of type
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true : elem bool
true1 : True true .= 1
false : elem bool
false0 : True false .= 0
not : elem (bool =⇒ bool)
not0 : True (F .= 0 ⇒ (not @ F) .= 1)
not1 : True (F .= 1 ⇒ (not @ F) .= 0)
and : elem (bool =⇒ bool =⇒ bool)
and1 : True (F .= 1 ∧ G .= 1 ⇒ (and@ F @G) .= 1)
and0 : True (F .= 0 ∨ G .= 0 ⇒ (and@ F @G) .= 0)
impl : elem (bool =⇒ bool =⇒ bool)
impl1 : True (F .= 0 ∨ G .= 1 ⇒ (impl@ F @G) .= 1)
impl0 : True (F .= 1 ∧ G .= 0 ⇒ (impl@ F @G) .= 0)
exists : elem ((univ =⇒ bool) =⇒ bool)
exists1 : {F : elem (univ =⇒ bool)}
True (∃ [x] (F @ x) .= 1 ⇒ (exists@ F) .= 1)
exists0 : {F : elem (univ =⇒ bool)}
True (∀ [x] (F @ x) .= 0 ⇒ (exists@ F) .= 0)
eq : elem (univ =⇒ univ =⇒ bool)
eq1 : True (F .= G ⇔ (eq@ F @G) .= 1)
Fig. 6. Specification of FOL models.
elem bool and returns the judgment that F is equal to 1. FOL-terms are interpreted as elements of the universe. Therefore,
we map the type i of FOL-terms to the type elem univ of elements of univ.
o := elem bool
ded := [F : elem bool] True (F .= 1)
i := elem univ
The interpretation of the logical connectives is as expected. For example, the disjunction F ∨G is interpreted by applying
or to µ(F) and µ(G). The universal quantification ∀ ([x : i] F) is interpreted as
µ(∀) µ([x : i] F) = forall@ λ ([x : elem univ]µ(F)).
∨ := [F : elem bool] [G : elem bool] or @ F @G
∀ := [F : elem (univ =⇒ bool)] forall@ (λ F)
Models of FOL-theories. Finally we can defineΣmod just likeΣpf :
Definition 25. For every FOL-signature or theoryΣ , the LF signatureΣmod is the canonical pushout in the diagram below.
FOLsyn
FOLmod
Σ syn
Σmod
µ µΣ
Here by canonical we mean thatΣmod includes FOLmod and adds a declaration c : µΣ (A) for every declaration c : A that
Σ syn adds to FOLsyn. µΣ maps FOLsyn-symbols according to µ and other symbols to themselves.
Example 26 (Continued). The signature Groupmod looks as follows:
%sig Groupmod = {
%include FOLmod
◦ : elem univ → elem univ → elem univ
e : elem univ
inv : elem univ → elem univ
assoc : True forall@ (λ[x] forall@ (λ[y] forall@ (λ[z]
eq@ (x ◦ (y ◦ z))@ ((x ◦ y) ◦ z)))) .= 1
...
}
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Notation 27. Note that the canonical pushout yields declarations
◦ : elem univ → elem univ → elem univ
rather than
◦ : elem (univ =⇒ univ =⇒ univ).
Thus,Groupmod is technically not a HOL-theory in the sense of Definition 22. However, we can give signaturemorphisms back
and forth between these. For example, if we have a signature with ◦′ : elem (univ =⇒ univ =⇒ univ), the morphisms map
◦′ to λ[x] λ[y] x ◦ y and ◦ to [x] [y] ◦′ @ x@ y. In the following, we will assume thatΣmod extends FOLmod with declarations
of the form c : elem S1 =⇒ · · · =⇒ Sn and omit the connecting signature morphisms from the notation.
Definition 28 (Encoding Models). Assume a fixed set theory in which FOL and HOL-models are defined, and pick two
arbitrary sets F and T as the truth values. Then for every FOL-signature Σ and every Σ-model M = (U, I), we define
a HOL-model pMq ofΣmod as follows:
0pMq = F 1pMq = T boolpMq = {F , T } univpMq = U,
notpMq, andpMq, orpMq, implpMq, eqpMq, forallpMq, and existspMq are defined in the obvious way, and for function symbols f and
predicate symbols pwe put
f pMq = f I and ppMq(u1, . . . , un) = T iff (u1, . . . , un) ∈ pI .
It is easy to check that this is indeed a HOL-model ofΣmod, i.e., satisfies all the axioms ofΣmod.
We could also encode model translations, but we can do this more elegantly in Section 5.
Example 29 (Continued). Consider the model Int from Example 15. It is encoded as a HOL-model of Groupmod by putting
univpIntq = Z, ◦pIntq = +, epIntq = 0, and invpIntq = −. The interpretations of all other symbols are uniquely determined.
4.5. Adequacy
In the previous sections, we have defined the LF signatures and morphisms (FOLsyn, FOLpf , π, FOLmod, µ) intended to
encode FOL. (π is simply an inclusion for FOL, but we will keep it in the notation to stress that FOL is only an example for
a generic method.) Showing that such an encoding is adequate means to show that the encoding has the same properties
as the encoded logic. If an encoding is adequate, meta-logical results reached by reasoning about the logic encoding are
guaranteed to hold for the encoded logic as well.
To give a general formal definition what adequacy means, we need to do three things: (i) define in general what a logic is
and when two logics are isomorphic, (ii) define in general what a logic encoding in LF is and how every such logic encoding
induces a logic, and then (iii) for a specific logic encoding show that the induced logic is isomorphic to the encoded logic.
Especially (ii) requires a large amount of work, which we carried out in [57]. For simplicity, here, we will only consider the
special case of adequacy of our encoding of FOL. For other logic encodings, the procedure is the same.
We begin by restating some known results for the adequacy of syntax and proof theory in our notation. See e.g. [31,34],
the encodings used there are not modular, but that is a minor difference that does not affect the proofs.
Theorem 30 (Adequacy for Syntax). For every FOL-signature Σ and context Γ = x1, . . . , xn, the formulas are in a natural
bijection with the βη-normal LF-terms of type o overΣ syn in context x1 : i, . . . , xn : i.
Theorem 31 (Adequacy for Signature Morphisms). For every FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′ and every sentence
F ∈ Sen(Σ), we have pσ(F)q = σ syn(pFq).
Theorem 32 (Adequacy for Proof Theory). For every FOL-theoryΣ , the derivations of F1, . . . , Fn ⊢Σ F are in a natural bijection
with the βη-normal LF-terms of type πΣ (ded pF1q→ · · · → ded pFnq→ ded pFq) overΣpf .
In particular, F is aΣ-theorem iff πΣ (ded pFq) is inhabited overΣpf .
Theorem 33 (Adequacy for Proof Theoretical Theory Morphisms). For a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′, we have
σ : (Σ,Θ) P→ (Σ ′,Θ ′) iff σ pf : Σpf → Σ ′pf can be extended to an LF signature morphism (Σ,Θ)pf → (Σ ′,Θ ′)pf .
Proof. This follows from Theorem 32 by extending σ pf such that every a : πΣ (ded pFq) occurring in (Σ,Θ)pf is mapped
to ppq for some proof p of Sen(σ )(F). 
To give similar results for the model theory, we need a bijection between FOL-models of Σ and HOL-models of Σmod.
First we prove that every single model of FOLmod is adequate in the following sense:
Lemma 34. Assume a HOL-model M of FOLmod. Then boolM = {0M , 1M} is a two-element set, univM is an arbitrary non-empty
set, and trueM , falseM , andM , orM , implM , eqM , forallM , and existsM are the usual operations in the semantics of first-order logic
with respect to the universe univM and the truth values 0M for falsity and 1M for truth.
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Proof. Straightforward using the axioms in FOLmod. 
Note that the interpretations of the booleans (and thus of the remaining operations on them) are not determined uniquely
because the specific choice of truth values remains free. If we wanted to characterize them uniquely, e.g., 0M = ∅ and
1M = {∅}, we would need to have more access to the underlying set theory than provided by HOL. However, once two
arbitrary truth values and the universe are fixed, the interpretation of the connectives and quantifiers is determined. Then
we can state the adequacy of the model theory as follows:
Theorem 35 (Adequacy for Model Theory). Assume a fixed set theory in which FOL- and HOL-models are defined, and pick two
arbitrary sets F and T . Let us call a FOLmod-model normal if 0 and 1 are interpreted as F and T .
Then for every FOL-signature Σ , there is a natural bijection between FOL-models M of Σ and normal HOL models of Σmod.
Furthermore, for every M and everyΣ-sentence F , we have
M |=Σ F iff (µΣ (ded pFq))pMq.
Recall that for FOL, we have µΣ (ded pFq) = True (µΣ (pFq) .= 1).
Proof. One direction of the bijection is the encoding M → pMq. For the inverse direction, assume a normal HOL-model
M of Σmod. Because M is normal and because of Lemma 34, M has no freedom but to pick a non-empty set for univM and
operations for f M and pM . It is easy to see that each such choice yields a FOL-model of Σ , and that the two functions are
bijections.
The second claim follows by a straightforward induction on F using the axioms of FOLmod. 
It is tempting to assume that, parallel to Theorem 33, σ : (Σ,Θ) M→ (Σ ′,Θ ′) can be encoded using LF-signature
morphisms (Σ,Θ)mod → (Σ ′,Θ ′)mod. But this is not the case: The existence of such morphisms is only sufficient but not
necessary for σ to be a model-theoretical theory morphism. This is because HOL is not complete with respect to standard
models. We will get back to this in Section 5.
Taking all these adequacy results together, we see that all results about FOL that can be stated in terms of encodings of
syntax, proof theory, and model theory, carry over to FOL. As an example, let us consider soundness and completeness.
Theorem 36. For a FOL-signatureΣ and LF terms Fi, F , define
(i) There is a term of type πΣ (ded F1 → · · · → ded Fn → ded F) overΣpf .
(ii) For every HOL-model M ofΣmod, if we have (µΣ (Fi))M for all i, then we also have (µΣ (F))M .
Then the logic FOL is sound iff (i) implies (ii), and complete iff (ii) implies (i).
Proof. Immediately using the adequacy of proof and model theory. 
Among all themeta-logical properties that can be studied after encoding a logic in LF, soundness is particularly interesting
because we have the following result:
Theorem 37. If there is a signature morphism σ from FOLpf to FOLmod such that π σ = µ, then the logic FOL is sound.
Proof. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that for every FOL-signatureΣ there is a signature morphism σΣ fromΣpf
toΣmod such that the following diagram commutes:
FOLsyn
FOLpf
FOLmod
Σ syn
Σpf
Σmod
µ
π
µΣ
πΣ
σ
σΣ
σΣ is simply the universal morphism factoring σ and µΣ through the pushoutΣpf .
Secondly, we show soundness using Theorem 36. So assume (i). Since signature morphisms are type-preserving
mappings, there must be a term of type
σΣ (πΣ (ded F1 → . . .→ ded Fn → ded F))
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overΣmod. Because πΣ σΣ = µΣ , this type is equal to
µΣ (ded F1)→ . . .→ µΣ (ded Fn)→ µΣ (ded F).
Now the implication introduction rule of HOL shows that (ii) holds. 
These results may be criticized as being implications between statements known to be true. But recall that the same
methodology can be applied to a very wide variety of other logics, and we obtain the corresponding result for every such
logic.
In general, Theorem 37 is only a sufficient criterion. It cannot be necessary for all logic encodings because HOL is only a
(sound but incomplete) fragment of set theory, whichmay ormay not be strong enough to carry out the soundness proof for
the encoded logic. However, in our experience such amorphism typically exists for reasonable choices of themeta-language.
It is tempting to look for the analogue of Theorem 37 for completeness. But a morphismΣmod → Σpf can usually not be
given. For example, FOLmod is significantly more expressive than FOLpf and therefore cannot be interpreted in FOLpf . Even
when such a morphism exists, it does not imply completeness. But it is promising to investigate other ways to encode
completeness, which we leave to future work. For example, the central idea of many completeness proofs is to construct a
canonical model whose objects are given by the syntax of the logic. Since LF provides an excellent way to talk about syntax,
it is interesting to use LF to form a canonical model. If the syntax of LF is be reflected into the representation of the model
theory, it can yield a general way of formalizing completeness proofs.
4.6. Soundness
FOLsyn
FOLpf
FOLmod
µ
π
σFOL
Nowwewill apply Theorem 37 to encode the soundness proof of FOL in LF by giving
a view σFOL from FOLpf to FOLmod. The structure of σFOL follows the modular structure
of FOLpf , i.e., the soundness is proved separately for every connective or quantifier. In
particular, σFOL includes the viewµ for all symbols of FOLsyn. Thus, the LFmodule system
guarantees the commutativity of the diagram on the right.
The remaining symbols of FOLpf are those encoding proof rules. Each of those must
be mapped to a proof term in FOLmod. This is straightforward, and we only give one
example case and refer [35] for the remaining cases.
The proof rule orIl : ded F → ded F ∨ G is included into FOLpf from ∨pf . It uses two implicit arguments F : o and G : o
and must be mapped to a FOLmod-term of type
{F : elem bool} {G : elem bool} True F .= 1 → True (or @ F @G) .= 1.
Its map is given by
orIl := [F : elem bool] [G : elem bool] [p : True F .= 1] ⇒E or1 (∨Il p).
Here⇒E is the modus ponens rule, and ∨Il is the left introduction rule of disjunction of the meta-language.⇒E and ∨Il
are among the proof rules declared in HOL, which we omitted in Section 4.3.
5. Representing set-theoretical model theory
The representation of models given in Section 4.4 uses HOL as a meta-language. HOL is seen as a fragment of the
foundation of mathematics, and to work with HOL rather than, e.g., a set theory, has the advantage of being simpler while
not committing to a specific foundation. But it also has a drawback: FOL-models are represented as HOL-models and thus
as platonic entities that live outside the logical framework LF.
It would bemore appealing if FOL-models could be represented as LF entities themselves. This is indeed possible without
changing the principal features of our approach: All we have to do is to refine the meta-language HOL so much that it
becomes set theory. The refinements can be represented elegantly as LF signature morphisms — in this case from the
encoding of HOL to an encoding of set theory.
More generally, we obtain the diagram below. Here (Lsyn, Lpf , π, Lmod, µ) is a logic encoding as before. The foundation
of mathematics is encoded as an LF signature F , and the model theory is defined in terms of a meta-language F0, which is a
fragment of F . A view ϕ : F0 → F encodes the refinement of F0 into F , or in other words, ϕ formalizes in what sense F0 is a
fragment of F . Finally, we want to give a view µ′ from Lmod to F , which translates the F0-based encoding of model theory to
F . µ′ must have some free parameters, and this can be expressed in LF by adding these free parameters to the codomain of
the view. Lmod+ is the extension of F with these parameters.
Then, for any choice of these parameters, the composition µ µ′ translates the logical syntax into mathematics. In other
words, we refine the logic encoding (Lsyn, Lpf , π, Lmod, µ) based on F0 to a logic encoding (Lsyn, Lpf , π, Lmod+, µ µ′) based
on F .
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Lsyn
Lpf
Lmod
F0 F
Lmod+
µ
π
ϕ
µ′
So far we have used first-order logic for L and higher-order logic for F0. In the following, we will give F , µ′, and ϕ. F will
be an encoding of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC, [71,19]) encoded as an LF signature ZFC developed in Section 5.1. ϕ
will give the standard semantics of higher-order logic encoded as a view from HOL to ZFC developed in Section 5.2. Note
that these steps are independent of the chosen logic L because higher-order logic is sufficient for the model theory of many
logics (including sorted, simply-typed, modal, description, and intuitionistic logics).Wewill give Lmod+ and the viewµ′ from
FOLmod to ZFC in Section 5.3. Lmod+ will arise by adding to ZFC a free parameter for the universe.
We use ZFC because it is the most widely used foundation of mathematics. Other set theories such as Von-Neumann–
Bernays–Gödel [68,8,23] could be used equally well. Similarly, type theoretic foundations such as HOL [14] or the Calculus
of Constructions [13] would work in the same way. We will elaborate on that in Section 5.2.
The above diagram still leaves open how individual models can be represented in LF. We will look at that in Section 5.4,
where we will form a signature Σmod+, which will be like Σmod but in terms of ZFC rather than HOL, and then represent
Σ-models as LF signature morphisms from Σmod+ to ZFC . Finally we look at the encoding of model theoretical theory
morphisms, at which point all aspects of FOL are encoded in LF. But since the Σ-models form a proper class and the LF
expressions are countable, this raises adequacy questions, which we discuss in Section 5.5.
5.1. Representing set theory
Nowwe will represent ZFC set theory in LF. This is a necessary condition for the comprehensive representation of model
theory in a logical framework. But it requires a significant investment. Very advanced encodings of set theory have been
established in Mizar ([65] using Tarski-Grothendieck set theory [66,63]), and in Isabelle/ZF [53,54] employing sophisticated
machine support. In particular, these encodings use semi-automated reasoning support and high-level proof description
languages such as Isar [49] for Isabelle. Our encoding was designed from scratch using hand-written proof terms.
There are two reasons to forgo those sophisticated encodings in favor of LF. Firstly, LF is superior to Isabelle as a logical
framework: The dependent type theory permits elegant encodings of logics, and the module system based on signature
morphisms permits elegant encodings of translations. We appreciate these fundamental aspects even though Isabelle is
vastly superior to LF in terms of automation and tool support. Mizar offers dependent types, but it is a standalone encoding
of set theory not based on a logical framework so that it cannot encode other languages such as logics or alternative set
theories.
Secondly, our encoding of set theory differs from the above two in two fundamental but non-trivial design aspects. In
both cases, only the existence of dependent types makes our design choices possible. These two aspects are the choice of
primitive symbols and the use of a type system, which we will detail in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively.
The whole encoding of set theory comprises over 1000 lines of Twelf declarations. Therefore, we only showcase themost
important features and refer to [35] for the full encoding. In the following we will first explain the logic we use for our set
theory in Section 5.1.1, then use it to develop untyped set theory in Section 5.1.2, and then build a typed set theory on top
of the untyped one in Section 5.1.3. Only the typed set theory will be strong enough to subsume the meta-language HOL we
developed in Section 4.3. Finally, we define the 2-element Boolean lattice B and its operations in Section 5.1.4. The Booleans
are not needed to subsumeHOL but are needed as the set of truth valueswhen defining the semantics of FOL. All declarations
together form the LF signature ZFC .
Notation 38. This section will require the reader to be very careful in separating levels as the LF encoding of ZFC contains
three groups of connectives and quantifiers.
The first two groups are meta-level operations on propositions. They share the propositional connectives which are
written normally, e.g.,∧. The first group consists of the symbols used in the (untyped) first-order logic underlying set theory;
here equality and quantifiers will be written as .=∗, ∀∗, and ∃∗. The second group consists of the symbols used in the typed
set theory that we will develop on top of the untyped one; here equality and quantifiers will be written as .=, ∀, and ∃.
Finally the third group consists of the object level operations on Booleans. These will be written as ∧∗, ∀∗, .=∗, etc.
The notations are chosen such that the symbols ∧, ∀, .=, etc. are the intended interpretations of their counterparts in
HOL, and the symbols ∧∗, ∀∗, .=∗, etc. are the intended interpretations of the symbols declared in FOLmod.
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5.1.1. Logical language
We base ZFC on first-order logic with equality. To reason about truth, we use an intuitionistic natural deduction calculus
with introduction and elimination rules. The main LF declarations encoding this logic are the following ones.
set : type
prop : type
True : prop → type
set is the single sort of sets, prop is the type of propositions, and True F is the judgment for the truth of F .
Wemake two additions to the otherwisewell-known syntax of first-order logic: sequential connectives and a description
operator. Both arise naturally when encoding set theory as we will see below.
Sequential connectives mean that, e.g., in an implication F ⇒ G, G is only considered if F is true. This is very natural in
mathematical practice — for example, mathematicians do not hesitate to write x ≠ 0 ⇒ x/x = 1 when / is only defined
for non-zero dividers. This can be solved by using first-order logic with partial functions, but we hold that it is more elegant
and closer to mathematics to use a sequential implication, i.e., the truth of F is assumed when considering G. Similarly, in
a sequential conjunction F ∧ G, F is assumed true when considering G. We use sequential conjunction and implication; all
other connectives are as usual.
Then the LF encoding contains the following declarations for propositions:
∧ : {F : prop} (True F → prop)→ prop
⇒ : {F : prop} (True F → prop)→ prop
¬ : prop → prop
∨ : prop → prop → prop
⇔ : prop → prop → prop
.=∗ : set → set → prop
∀∗ : (set → prop)→ prop
∃∗ : (set → prop)→ prop
Thus ∧ and⇒ are applied to two arguments, a formula F and another formula which is stated in a context where F is
true. This is written as, e.g., F ∧ [p]G p where p is a proof of F that may be used by G. We will use F ∧ G and F ⇒ G as
abbreviations when p does not occur in G; this yields the non-sequential variants of the connectives as special cases.
At this point it is not possible for G to actually make use of the truth of F because proofs cannot occur in formulas. This
will change by the use of a description operator, and we will also use it when defining our typed set theory.
The proof rules for the sequential connectives are almost the same as for the usual ones. The only difference is that the
proof of the first argument has to be supplied in a few places:
∧I : {p : True F} True G p → True F ∧ [p]G p
∧El : True F ∧ [p]G p → True F
∧Er : {q : True F ∧ [p]G p} True G (∧El q)
⇒ I : ({p : True F} True G p) → True F ⇒ [p]G p
⇒ E : True F ⇒ [p]G p → {p : True F} True G p
Note that these rules contain the rules for the non-sequential connectives as special cases. We omit the well-known
encoding of the introduction and elimination proof rules for the remaining connectives.
The description operator is a binder that takes a formula F x with a free variable and returns the unique x satisfying F x.
This is of course not well-formed for all F . Therefore, δ takes a dependent argument, which is a proof of ∃∗![x] F x. Here ∃∗!
abbreviates the quantifier of unique existence. It can be encoded naturally using the following declarations.
∃∗! : (set → prop)→ set = [F ] ∃∗[x] F x ∧ (∀∗[y] F y ⇒ y .=∗x)
δ : {F : set → prop} (True ∃∗![x] F x) → set
Here dependent types permit us to require a proof of unique existence as an argument, thus guaranteeing that only well-
formed terms are formed. This is in contrast to the two description operators that are formalized in Isabelle/ZF or induced
by the Mizar type system, respectively. Both are well-formed even for unsatisfiable formulas, in which case they return an
arbitrary element. Thus, both Isabelle/ZF and Mizar assume not only the axiom of choice but also the existence of a global
choice function, a commitment that we can avoid.
δ comes with an axiom scheme
axδ : True F (δ ([x] F x) P)
for an arbitrary proof P , which states that δ indeed yields the elementwith property F . Note that proof irrelevance is derivable
from axδ , i.e., (δ F P) returns the same object no matter which proof P is used.
Note that both sequential connectives and the description operator crucially depend on the existence of dependent types
in the logical framework.
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5.1.2. Untyped set theory
Regarding the primitive symbols, our encoding attempts to stay as closely to mathematical practice as possible. We only
use a single primitive non-logical symbol: the binary predicate ∈: set → set → prop. This means that the only terms are
the variables and those obtained from the description operator. Thus, all mathematical symbols besides ∈ are introduced as
abbreviations for sets whose (unique) existence has been proved.
Our encoding is in contrast to Mizar, where primitive function symbols are used for singleton, unordered pair, and union
[66] together with Tarski’s axiom of universes, and to Isabelle/ZF, where primitive function symbols are used for empty set,
powerset, union, infinite set, and replacement [54].
This permits us to follow the literature and encode all ZFC operations as existential axioms. For example, we can use
∀∗[X] ∃∗[u] (∀∗[y] (∃[x] x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ x)⇒ y ∈ u)
as the axiom of union. From this we can obtain a proof P X of
∃∗![u] (∀∗[y] (∃[x] x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ x)⇔ y ∈ u)
for an arbitrary set X . Then we can define the union operation as follows:
: set → set = [X] δ ([u] ∀∗[y] (∃[x] x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ x)⇔ y ∈ u) (P X)
Similarly, we proceed to define the empty set, unordered pairs, and powersets using the respective axiom, as well as
encodings of the sets {x ∈ A|F(x)} and {f (x) : x ∈ A} using the axiom schemes of specification and replacement, respectively.
Furthermore, we use δ and the axiom of infinity to obtain a specific infinite set, in our case the set of natural numbers. For all
results described in this paper, we do not use δ or any of these seven axioms anywhere else, i.e., all other sets and operations
on sets are defined in terms of these seven applications of δ.
Our results do not actually require the axioms of choice and excluded middle. Similarly, regularity and infinity are not
used for the results presented in this section. However, these axioms may be needed to construct specific models such as
models with an infinite domain.
We define ordered pairs (x, y) as {{x}, {{y},∅}}. Our definition is unusual and similar to Wiener’s {{{x},∅}, {{y}}} [69].
We do not use the common Kuratowski pairs {{x}, {x, y}} because reasoning about them often requires the principle of
excludedmiddle to distinguish the cases x .=∗y and x̸ .=∗y, which we try to avoid unless necessary. However, we immediately
define the projections π1 and π2 and prove the conversions
πi(x1, x2)
.=∗xi and isPair u ⇒ (π1(u), π2(u)) .=∗u,
which are known from simple type theory. Afterwards all work is carried out in terms of these derived operations and
properties so that the specific definition of pairing becomes less relevant. (The LF module system can check that only the
derived operations are used.)
Based on ordered pairs, we can define relations and functions in the usual way. In particular, we define set theoretical
notions of λ abstraction and application as operations λ∗ A ([x : set] f x) encoding {(x, f (x)) : x ∈ A} and f @∗ a encoding
‘‘the b such that (a, b) ∈ f ’’. Again we immediately prove the conversions of β- and η-equality and use only those later on.
In a similar way, we define various other notions such as subset, singleton set, binary union, intersection, difference,
disjoint union, etc., and derive natural deduction rules for them.
5.1.3. Typed set theory
Wehave already remarked that amajor problemwith formalizations of set theory is their complexity. Type theories favor
algorithmic definitions and decidable notions, and these prove indispensable when formalizing major parts of mathematics
in a computer.
It is not surprising that most of the biggest successes of formalized mathematics, such as the formalization of the Four
Color Theorem and the Kepler Conjecture [24,29], are achieved in type theory-based formalizations of mathematics — Coq
[7] and HOL Light [30], respectively. Similarly, while Mizar is untyped a priori, it supports a very sophisticated type system
as a derived notion that is internally represented using predicates over sets [70]. Isabelle/ZF offers much weaker support for
typed reasoning, and this is one of the main reasons why both tool support and available content are farther developed in
Isabelle/HOL [51] using a typed foundation rather than in Isabelle/ZF.
In LF, again using the dependent typing, we can derive typed set theory in a rather simple way. The crucial idea is to use
the dependent sum type
elem A := Σx:set(True x ∈ A)
to represent the set A. Thus, elements x of A are represented as pairs (x, P), where P is a proof that x is indeed in A. If we
also require proof irrelevance, i.e., (x, P) = (x, P ′), then the type elem A has exactly one term for every element of A. This
is inspired by the Scunak language [10], which uses this representation as a primitive notion and provides implementation
support for it.
It is a minor inconvenience that LF (unlike Scunak) supports neither dependent sum types nor the ability to make all
elements of a type definitionally equal (which would permit to state the proof irrelevance). Therefore, we have to add elem
and its properties as primitives to our LF encoding, as shown below
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elem : set → type
el : {x : set} True x ∈ A → elem A
which : elem A → set
why : {a : elem A} True (which a) ∈ A
along with an axiom for proof irrelevance and one for (which (el x P)) .=∗ x. el, which, and why would simply be pairing
and the two projections if LF had sum types. While this increases the needed primitives, these declarations only emulate
features that could easily be added to the LF language: Dependent sum types are used in, e.g., [43,50]; proof irrelevance is
added in [40].
Using the types elem A, we can now lift all the basic untyped operations introduced above to the typed level. In particular,
we define typed quantifiers ∀, ∃, typed equality .=, and typed function spaces=⇒ in the following.
Firstly, we define typed quantifiers such as ∀ : (elem A → prop) → prop. In higher-order logic with internal
propositions ([14], compare prop : set rather than prop : type in Section 4.3), such typed quantification can be defined
easily. In untyped set theory, this is intuitively possible using relativization, e.g., ∀ F := ∀∗[x] x ∈ A ⇒ F x for F : elem A →
prop.
However, an attempt to formally define typed quantification like this meets a subtle difficulty: In ∀ F , F only needs to be
defined for elements of A, whereas in ∀∗[x] x ∈ A ⇒ F x, F must be defined for all sets. Thus, ∀ is more general than ∀∗ in
that it permits a weaker argument. Of course, in ∀∗[x] x ∈ A ⇒ F x, it is intended not to consider F x if x ∉ A. This is the
motivation behind the introduction of sequential connectives in Section 5.1.1 above.
Using sequential connectives, we can define ∀ and ∃ as follows:
∀ : (elem A → prop)→ prop = [F ] ∀∗[x] x ∈ A ⇒ [p] (F (el x p))
∃ : (elem A → prop)→ prop = [F ] ∃∗[x] x ∈ A ∧ [p] (F (el x p))
Then we can derive introduction and elimination rules for ∀ and ∃, which look the same as those for the untyped ones.
Secondly, typed equality is easy to define:
.= : elem A → elem A → prop = [a] [b] (which a) .=∗ (which b)
It is easy to see that all rules for .=∗ can be lifted to .=.
Finally, we can define function types that are defined in terms of untyped functions:
=⇒ : set → set → set = . . .
λ : (elem A → elem B) → elem (A =⇒ B) = . . .
@ : elem (A =⇒ B) → elem A → elem B = . . .
beta : True ((@ (λ [x] F x) A) .=∗ F A) = . . .
eta : True ((λ [x] (@ F x)) .=∗ F) = . . .
We omit the quite involved definitions and only mention that the typed quantifiers and thus the sequential connectives
are needed in the definitions.
5.1.4. The Booleans
The Booleans B are easy to define as the set containing the two elements 0 = ∅ and 1 = {∅}. However, it is interesting
to note that there are two different ways to define this set: We can use the unordered pair {0, 1} or the powerset P (1).
Clearly, {0, 1} is a two-element set and {0, 1} ⊆ P (1), but it turns out that the two sets are only equal in the presence of
the axiom of excludedmiddle. In fact, – maybe surprisingly – by using the set {x ∈ 1 | F}, it can be shown that {0, 1} .=∗P (1)
is equivalent to F ∨ ¬F for all formulas F .
Therefore, an intuitionistic set theory would have to define B = {0, 1}, and it presents no fundamental obstacles to do
so. But it is more convenient to use B = P (1) because then all operations on the Booleans can be obtained from the lattice
operations in P (1). Therefore, we put B = P (1).
Then most of the operations on the Booleans are straightforward:
¬∗ : elem B =⇒ B = λ[x] 1 \ x
∧∗ : elemB =⇒ B =⇒ B = λ[x] λ[y] x ∩ y
∨∗ : elemB =⇒ B =⇒ B = λ[x] λ[y] x ∪ y
⇒∗ : elemB =⇒ B =⇒ B = λ[x] λ[y] reflect (x ⊆ y)
∀∗ : elem (A =⇒ B) =⇒ B = λ[f ] (image f )
∃∗ : elem (A =⇒ B) =⇒ B = λ[f ] (image f )
where \ returns the difference of two sets, image f is the image of the function f , reflect F encodes the set {x ∈ 1|F}, and
and

return the union or intersection, respectively, of a set of sets. We omit their definitions.
In the usual way, we can prove the basic properties of the lattice operations, from which we can prove the intended
properties of the Boolean operations.
Finally, we use the axiom of excluded middle once to prove that B is equal to {0, 1}.
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5.2. Viewing higher-order logic in set theory
Now that we have developed an encoding of set theory, we want to show that it subsumes the meta-language HOL used
in Section 4 to represent model theory. Let ZFC be the LF signature containing our set theory. Then the subsumption can be
expressed in LF formally as a view from HOL to ZFC .
This basic idea of the view is straightforward because all constants of HOL are mapped to ZFC-constants of the same
name, i.e., we have a view
%view ϕ : HOL → ZFC = {
set := set
elem := elem
prop := prop
True := True
...
}
The view must also map all proof rules of HOL to proofs of the corresponding ZFC theorems. For the propositional
connectives, those are the same rules assumed for the first-order logic underlying ZFC . For the quantifiers and equality,
they are derived rules for ∀, ∃, and .=. For β- and η-equality, they are the corresponding derived rules of ZFC .
Instead of ZFC set theory, we could use any other foundation into which we can give such a view ϕ. This includes other
set theories but also typed foundations such as the usual higher-order logic with internal propositions. For example, the
latter arises if we use the type theory from Section 2.2 but with a declaration prop : tp; in that case the view would map
prop to tm prop.
5.3. Viewing model theory in set theory
Next we should define a view µ′ from FOLmod to ZFC . However, it is not possible to fix the value of µ′(univ) because it
may be different in every model. Thus, µ′ must be parametric in the choice of µ′(univ) and consequently also in that of
µ′(nonemp). We solve that by introducing FOLmod+ as ZFC with two free parameters as below
%sig FOLmod+ = {
%include ZFC
U : set
P : True ∃∗[x] x ∈ U
}
and giving a view µ′ : FOLmod → FOLmod+ instead.
FOLmod FOLmod+
HOL ZFC
ϕ
µ′This view is again modular to interpret every connective separately. Moreover,
µ′ includes (and thus reuses) ϕ so that the LF module system guarantees that the
diagram on the right commutes. We will not present the modular structure here,
but rather give examples of the most interesting cases.
µ′ interprets the booleans as the two-element set of truth values, andmaps univ
and nonemp to the free parameters U and P as below.
bool := B
0 := 0
1 := 1
...
univ := U
nonemp := P
All connectives and quantifiers are mapped to their counterparts on B, e.g., or is
mapped to ∧∗ and forall to ∀∗. The proofs of the axioms are simple.
5.4. Representing model theory
Models. Assume a logic encoding (Lsyn, Lpf , π, Lmod+, µ µ′) using a foundation F as before. The basic idea behind the encoding
of L-modelsM ofΣ is given by the diagram below. HereΣmod+ arises in the sameway asΣmod, i.e., by pushout ofΣ syn along
µ µ′ over Lsyn, or equivalently by pushout of Σmod along µ′ over Lmod. Then the encoding pMq of M is a morphism from
Σmod+ to F such that following diagram commutes:
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Lsyn
Lmod+
F F
Σ syn
Σmod+
µ µ′ µΣ µ′Σ
idF
pMq
Notation 39. The notation pMqwas already used in Section 4 for the encoding ofM in HOL. We will reuse it in Section 5 for
the encoding of a modelM in LF.
This encoding captures and formalizes two of the most central intuitions about the syntax and semantics of formal
languages. Firstly, the semantics of a formal language is a structure-preserving translation of the syntax into some semantic
realm. For logics the semantic realm is usually mathematics, in our case encoded by a foundation F . The interpretation
function is given by µΣ µ′Σ pMq. Secondly, the syntax consists of two parts: logical and non-logical symbols. In our case,
the semantics of the logical symbols is given by a fixed morphism µ µ′, and the semantics of the non-logical symbols is
given by the morphism pMq.
pMqmust map all symbols ofΣmod+, which can be split into three groups. Firstly, symbols included from F have a fixed
meaning in the foundation; the commutativity ensures that pMq is the identity on them. Secondly, symbols included from
Lmod+ encode fixed parts of the models that do not depend on the signature; in the case of FOL, this is the universe encoded
using the symbols U and P . Thirdly, the symbols inherited from Σ syn when constructing the pushout are the non-logical
symbols.
We can formalize the above intuitions as follows:
Definition 40 (Encoding Models). An LF-based model of a FOL-signature or theory Σ is a morphism I : Σmod+ → ZFC that
is a retraction of the inclusion ZFC ↩→ Σmod+.
Note that this definition includes the case when Σ is a theory. In that case, LF-based models map the axioms in Σmod+
(which stem from the pushout ofΣ syn) to proof terms in ZFC .
Definition 41 (Encoding Semantics). Assume an LF-based model I of a FOL-signature Σ and a term or formula E over Σ .
Then the LF-based semantics of E is given by (µΣ µ′Σ I)(pEq), which we also write as JEKI .
Due to the type preservation of LF signature morphism, the LF-based semantics JtKI of a term t is indeed an (encoding of
an) element of the universe and the LF-based semantics JFKI of a formula is an (encoding of a) truth value.
We have a very strict notion of identity between LF-basedmodels inherited from LF signaturemorphisms: Two signature
morphisms are equal if they agree for all arguments up to βη-equality. For the representation of models, we need a more
relaxed notion based on whether equality can be proved in ZFC:
Definition 42 (Equality of Models). Two LF-based model I1 and I2 of a FOL-signature or theoryΣ are provably equal if
True I1(U)
.=∗I2(U) and all types True I1(s) .= I2(s)
for all function or predicate symbols s ofΣ are inhabited.
Note that ifΣ is a theory, we do not require the equality of I1(a) and I2(a) for axioms a, i.e., the proofs of the axioms are
irrelevant (as long as they exist). Similarly, we do not require any equality of I1(P) and I2(P).
Model reduction. As before, a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′ is encoded as an LF signature morphism σ syn : Σ syn →
Σ ′syn, and pushout along µµ′ yields an LF signature morphism σmod+ : Σmod+ → Σ ′mod+. Then our representation of
models as morphisms permits a very elegant representation of model reduction by composition with σmod+.
Theorem 43 (Encoding Model Reduction). Assume a FOL signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′. If I is an LF-based model ofΣ ′, then
σmod+ I is an LF-based model ofΣ . Moreover, for a term or formula E overΣ , we have
JEKσmod+ I = Jσ(E)KI .
Proof. Both claims follow immediately from the properties of signature morphisms and the construction of σmod+ by
pushout. 
Readers familiar with institutions will recognize the second claim as the satisfaction condition.
Example 44 (Continued). Consider the model Int from Example 15. It can be represented as an LF-based model I :
GrpSigmod+ → ZFC . I(U) is the ZFC-term for the set of integers, which is straightforward to define using the natural numbers.
I(P) is some proof over ZFC that proves U is non-empty. Then we only have to define I for the symbols ◦, e, and inv, which
are mapped to ZFC-expressions representing the operations+, 0, and inv on the integers.
Via pushout, the FOL-signature morphism
MonGrp : MonSig → GrpSig
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from Example 5 gives rise to an LF signature morphism
MonGrpmod+ : MonSigmod+ → GrpSigmod+.
The encoding of the model reduct Mod(MonGrp)(Int) is obtained as the composition MonGrpmod+ I as in the following
diagram:
FOLmod+ MonSigmod+ GrpSigmod+
MonGrpmod+
ZFC
I
MonGrpmod I agrees with I but is not defined for inv.
Alternatively, we can encode Int as a model of the theory Group. That model must map from Groupmod+ to ZFC , i.e.,
additionally maps the axioms of Group to ZFC . These are mapped to proofs that the integers do indeed satisfy the axioms of
a group.
5.5. Adequacy
The encoding ofmodels as signaturemorphisms raises a difficult question based on a simple cardinality argument: There
is a proper class of FOL-models ofΣ , but only countably many signature morphisms to encode them. Therefore, we have to
look carefully at the adequacy of our encoding.
First of all we have:
Lemma 45. Our encoding of set theory is adequate in the following sense:
• Every closed term t : set induces a set xty.
• Two closed terms s, t induce the same set if the type True s .=∗t is inhabited.
• For every closed term t : elem A, the set xwhich ty is an element of xAy.
Proof. All claims rely on the assumption that every proof rule of the underlying first-order logic and every axiom in ZFC is
soundwith respect to the platonic universe of set theory. For researchers objecting to parts of the encoding (e.g., to excluded
middle), the corresponding result holds after modifying ZFC .
For the first claim, we expand all definitions in t . This yields either a term of the formwhich (el t ′ P), which is provably
equal to the smaller term t ′ so that we can recurse, or a term of the form δ F Q . Thus, for every term t : set , we can obtain
a provable formula ∃∗![x] F x ∧ F t . This shows the existence of a set that t represents. The second claim holds because the
existence of a term inhabiting True s .=∗t shows that s .=∗t is a provable formula. The third claim follows easily from the first
one. 
Then we have:
Theorem 46. Assume a FOL-signatureΣ . Every LF-based model I induces a FOL-model xIy.
Proof. The universe of xIy is the set xI(U)y. ForΣ-symbols s, the interpretation of s in xIy is the object xwhich I(s)y. 
Whether or not all sets andmodels are induced by LF-terms and LF-basedmodels is a philosophical question. If we adopt
a formalist or even a constructivist point of view, then the LF-terms are (representatives of) all the sets and thus the LF-
based models are all the models. If we adopt a platonic point of view, only some models can be encoded, but these include
– intuitively – all models whose components can be written down or named. Furthermore, we can always create variations
of our signature ZFC to accommodate other perspectives. For example, we can add a choice operator to represent models
obtained by applying the axiom of choice.
Then we have the following adequacy results for those models that can be represented:
Definition 47. A FOL-modelM is definable ifM = xIy for some LF-based model I . In that case we also write I = pMq.
Theorem 48 (Adequacy for Model Theory). For every definable FOL-model M ofΣ , and every term or formula E overΣ , we have
JEKM = xJEKpMqy.
Proof. This is straightforward from the definitions. The only subtlety is to show that xJEKpMqy does not depend on which
LF-based model is chosen for pMq. But that is the case because any two possible choices must be provably equal. 
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Theorem 49 (Adequacy for Model Reduction). For every FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′ and every definable FOL-model
M ′ ofΣ ′, we have
Mod(σ )(M ′) = xσmod+ pM ′qy.
In particular, reducts of definable models are definable.
Proof. This is straightforward from the definitions. 
Finally, even though we may not be able to encode all models, we can adequately encode the property of being a model
theoretical theory morphism:
Theorem 50 (Adequacy for Model Theoretical Theory Morphisms). For a FOL-signature morphism σ : Σ → Σ ′, we have
σ : (Σ,Θ) M→ (Σ ′,Θ ′) iff σmod+ : Σmod+ → Σ ′mod+ can be extended to an LF signature morphism ϑ : (Σ,Θ)mod+ →
(Σ ′,Θ ′)mod+.
Proof. Consider the following commutative diagram, where as before σ syn : Σ syn → Σ ′syn is the encoding of σ and all
mod+-nodes arise as pushouts of the corresponding syn-node along µµ′ : Lsyn → Lmod+:
Σ syn Σ ′syn
(Σ,Θ)syn (Σ ′,Θ ′)syn
σ syn
Σmod+ Σ ′mod+
(Σ,Θ)mod+ (Σ ′,Θ ′)mod+
σmod+
ϑ
The claim is that σ is a model theoretical theory morphism iff such a ϑ exists.
The right-to-left direction is easy: ϑ contains proof terms that show that the reduct of a (Σ ′,Θ ′)-model satisfies all the
axioms ofΘ .
To show the converse direction, recall that we only consider finite theories, and observe that givenΣ ,Θ ,Σ ′,Θ ′, and σ ,
we can write the following formula in the first-order language of ZFC.
f = ∀U, s1, . . . , sn.

M ′(U, s1, . . . , sn) ∧i A′i(U, s1, . . . , sn)
⇒ M(U, σ1, . . . , σm) ∧i Ai(U, σ1, . . . , σm)
Herem is the number of function and predicate symbols declared inΣ;Σ ′ declares function and predicate symbols named
s1, . . . , sn; M(x, y1, . . . , ym) expresses that (x, y1, . . . , ym) is a Σ-model with universe x; Ai(x, y1, . . . , ym) expresses that
said Σ-model satisfies the i-th axiom in Θ; M ′(x, y1, . . . , yn) and A′i(x, y1, . . . , yn) are defined accordingly for Σ ′ and Θ ′;
and σi ∈ {s1, . . . , sn} is the result of applying σ to si.
Then f is a theorem over ZFC iff σ is a model-theoretical theory morphism. So assume a proof of f , fromwhich we obtain
a corresponding LF proof term p over the signature ZFC .
Moreover, over the signature Σ ′mod+, which extends ZFC , we have a proof term q proving M ′(U, s1, . . . , sn) ∧
i A
′
i(U, s1, . . . , sn). From p and q, we obtain a Σ
′mod+-proof term ri proving Ai(U, σ1, . . . , σn) for the i-th axiom in Θ .
By putting ϑ(ai) = ri, we obtain the needed LF signature morphism. 
The above proof rests on the philosophical assumption that a statement about ZFC – in this case, the statement σ :
(Σ,Θ)
M→ (Σ ′,Θ ′) – can only be true if there is a proof of it in the first-order language of ZFC. Moreover, we assume that
this first-order language is indeed the one that we encoded in ZFC . Researchers workingwith a different variant of set theory
can apply Theorem 50 accordingly after modifying ZFC .
Finally, observe that the proof depends on the ability to switch between the internal representation of models – the
tuples (U, s1, . . . , sn), which can be encoded as LF terms over ZFC – and the external representation ofmodels as LF signature
morphisms into ZFC .
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6. Related work
There are formalizations of the semantics of formal languages in various frameworks. For example, in [9], a simple
functional programming language is formalized in Coq [7]. In [47], a simple while-language is formalized in Isabelle/HOL
[51]. Both use domain theoretical models formalized based on posets where we use set theoretical models. In [11], simple
type theory is formalized in ALF [46] using the normalization-by-evaluation method. They use a glued model in which
interpretations are paired with normal forms. A similar result was obtained in [15] using Kripke models.
Although the settings of these results are very different from each other’s and from ours, all approaches are quite similar
in that they define syntax and models and give an interpretation function satisfying a soundness property. A novelty of our
approach is to base themodels on an explicitly formalized foundation:We formalize set theory and use sets as the universes
of the models. In the cited formalizations, on the other hand, the universes are types of the framework’s type theory, which
thus acts as an implicit foundation. Our approachmakes the foundation flexible and avoids such an implicit commitment. For
example, we could represent the cited formalizations in LF using an LF signature for Coq, Isabelle/HOL, or ALF, respectively,
instead of the one for set theory.
Another difference is that the cited approaches all represent the interpretation function as a function of the framework’s
type theory. As this is impossible in LF, we use LF signature morphisms, which are less flexible but provide an elegant
characterization of sound interpretation functions.
Dually, there are other formalizations of the semantics of formal languages in Twelf. In [5], a formalization of HOL in
Twelf is used to define the semantics of a machine language for proof-carrying code. This work does not focus on the
separation of syntax, models, and interpretation. Instead, all notions are introduced as definitional extensions of HOL. From
our perspective, they use HOL as the foundation and define themodels by extendingHOL, whereas syntax and interpretation
function are left implicit. In [39], an SML-equivalent language is given, and state-transition systems are used to formalize
the evaluation of expressions. These corresponds to our models, but they are not strictly separated from the syntax as in our
case. Like our views, the interpretation function and soundness proof live on the meta-level: They are given by a number
of logic programs formalized in the Twelf meta-theory. Despite their formidable sizes, both these Twelf developments are
monolithic because they predate the module system.
Regarding our specific encodings, the encodings of first-order syntax and proof theory are straightforward and well-
known (see, e.g., [31]). Only the systematic use of modularity is novel. Our encoding of HOL is well-known, too, but note that
there are two flavors of HOL, both based on simple type theory. The most common one based on [14] treats propositions as
terms of a special type prop. In LF, that would correspond to the declaration prop : set . This flavor is used in, e.g., [34,5,30,51].
The advantage is that the connectives and quantifiers can be introduced as HOL-terms. Our variant with prop : type treats
propositions as external to the type theory, i.e., propositions are not HOL-terms. This is more general and necessary to treat
HOL as a fragment of first-order set theory where propositions and sets are strictly separated.
Our encoding of set theory is novel both in general and in the context of Twelf. The most advanced other formalizations
of set theories are the ones in Mizar [65] and Isabelle/ZF [54]. Scunak [10] is a recent system developed specifically to
exploit dependent type theory when encoding set theory. We discussed the differences between these and our encoding
in Section 5.1. Other ways to encode set theory in dependently-typed frameworks use the framework’s type theory as the
foundation of mathematics, as in [2]. Such encodings can be mechanized in systems like Agda and Coq, see e.g., [27].
The main advantage of these other systems over LF/Twelf is that they provide a stronger notion of definitional equality
and (semi-)automated proof support. For example, Isabelle, Agda, and Coq permit the declaration of recursive functions that
are evaluated automatically by the framework. Scunak implements the proof irrelevance we axiomatize in Section 5.1.3. All
of them are connected to automated or semi-automated proof tools or provide tactic languages. LF, on the other hand,
is ontologically much simpler, even minimalistic. Consequently, proof terms are fully explicit and more complicated to
construct by hand. But LF (as well as Scunak) can benefit from the use of higher-order abstract syntax, which simplifies the
reasoning about adequacy relative to traditional mathematics.
Finally, the idea of encoding models as morphisms goes back to Lawvere’s work on functorial models [38] and the work
on initial algebra semantics, e.g., in [28]. While these have been developed in logical frameworks on paper before, e.g., in
[48,22], our work marks the first time that they can be formalized and machine-checked in a logical framework.
7. Conclusion
Wehave given a comprehensive representation of first-order logic in a logical framework. Contrary to previouswork, our
representation covers both the proof and themodel theoretical semantics given as provability and satisfaction, respectively.
For example, the framework of institutions has been applied to the model theoretical semantics [21], and the framework
LF to the proof theoretical semantics [31], but a comprehensive representation has so far been lacking. This was due to the
large ontological and philosophical differences between these two views on logic.
These differences are so big that we needed three major preliminary efforts to make this representation possible. In
[57,58], we conceived the logical framework combining model and proof theory that we have built upon here. In [59], we
gave the LF and Twelf module system that we used to implement the representation. In fact, our work is the largest case
study in the Twelf module system to date. And finally, we needed a representation of a foundation of mathematics, which
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we have described in Section 5.1. These combine to a strong and flexible framework whose potential is exemplified by the
representation of FOL we have given.
Our work will leverage future representations in two ways. Firstly, framework design and implementation are in place
now, and this paper provides a detailed template how to represent logics. In fact, we have started this already [35], and we
expect further successes fast. Secondly, the Twelf module system permits the reuse of existing representation fragments.
Our representation has separated all language features into independent and reusable components so that further logics can
be represented by only adding individual language features such as sorted quantification or simple function types.Moreover,
the meta-language for the model theory and its interpretation in ZFC set theory are composedmodularly as well. Therefore,
they cannot only be reused for many other logics but can also be refined flexibly if a more expressive meta-language or
a different foundation of mathematics are needed. For example, we could easily extend the meta-language from HOL to a
dependently-typed DHOL for a particular logic representation.
An important application of logical frameworks is to use the logic representations to reason about the represented logic.
To that effect, we gave adequacy results for syntax, proof theory, andmodel theory, and for the respective translations along
morphisms. We gave a criterion to prove the soundness of a logic within the framework, and we used this to give a fully
machine-verified soundness proof of first-order logic. A similar treatment of completeness remains future work.
Finally, our work is part of a larger effort to obtain an atlas of logics and translations between them. Our work explains
and exemplifies how logics, foundation, and models should be represented. A similar case study for logic translations was
given recently in [60].Within the LATIN project [35], our results will be integratedwith the heterogeneous specification tool
Hets [45] and the scalable Web infrastructure based on the markup language OMDoc [36].
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